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NOTES
IN FINLEY'S WAKE: FORGING A VIABLE FIRST
AMENDMENT APPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENT'S
SUBSIDIZATION OF THE ARTS
Eric J. Cleary*
INTRODUCTION
[T]he so-called "art" that I have been opposing and continue to
oppose and will oppose until we cut off funding for it, is so rotten, so
crude, so disgusting, so filthy, that it turns the stomach of any
normal person.'
This statement represents the conservative battle cry in the cultural
clash that erupted after a politically charged art scandal pitted
political conservatives against progressive artists.2 The controversy
arose in April 1989, when the Executive Director of the American
Family Association discovered that the National Endowment for the
Arts ("NEA") had funded an exhibit of Andres Serrano's "Piss
Christ," a photograph of a plastic crucifix submerged in a jar of the
artist's urine.3  As the controversy grew, the Corcoran gallery in
Washington cancelled an exhibition of Robert Mapplethorpe's
photography, partly funded by the NEA, which included homoerotic
and sadomasochistic images. This cancellation angered the arts
* This Note is dedicated to my family for their unwavering support and
encouragement.
1. 137 Cong. Rec. 23,464 (1991) (statement of Sen. Helms).
2. See Rene6 Linton, Comment, The Artistic Voice: Is it in Danger of Being
Silenced?, 32 Cal. W. L. Rev. 195, 202 (1995) (noting that the ire of the NEA
controversy grew out of the divergent sociocultural interests between religious
fundamentalists and political conservatives on the one hand, and a group of feminist,
lesbian, gay, and ethnic artists on the other); Daniel Mach, Note, The Bold and the
Beautifuk Ar4 Public Spaces, and the First Amendment, 72 N.Y.U. L Rev. 383, 383
(1997) (arguing that powerful cultural tensions surface over the value of artistic
expression); see also Linda A. Mellina, Note, Decency v. the Arts: And the Winner
is... The National Endowment for the Arts?, 29 Seton Hall L Rev. 1513, 1518 (1999)
(noting that a battle ensued over federal support for the arts and censorship).
3. See John H. Garvey, Black and White Images, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Autumn 1993, at 189, 190-91.
4. See Mary Ellen Kresse, Comment, Turmioil at the National Endowment for the
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community and failed to placate Congress.5
In response to incensed constituents, members of Congress initiated
a campaign to restrict the NEA's grant-making procedures as a
safeguard against future controversial grants.6 Attendant to its "moral
agenda," the religious right clamored for the complete abolition of the
NEA.7 Proponents of the arts, meanwhile, labeled the fundamentalist
attack on the NEA "censorship."'  After a series of unsuccessful
legislative proposals and enactments, Congress ultimately altered the
grant-making criteria of the NEA to include consideration of "general
standards of decency" in awarding funding to potential grant
recipients.9
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the United States
Supreme Court declared this decency standard constitutional. 0
Because Finley involved a control on the governmental funding of
speech through a selective subsidization process, rather than a
sanction against private speech, the Court confronted a murky realm
of First Amendment jurisprudence.1 Private speech, unless it falls
into a specific "low-value" category, such as obscenity, is strongly
protected by the First Amendment. 2 Subsidized speech, which is
speech promoted by the government through the allocation of monies
or tax breaks, has often gone unprotected unless the government's
funding standards are either viewpoint discriminatory or violate the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 13 Cognizant of the potential
indoctrinating effect of subsidized speech, First Amendment scholars
Arts: Can Federally Funded Art Survive the "Mapplethorpe Controversy"?, 39 Buff. L.
Rev. 231, 234-35 (1991); Carole S. Vance, The War on Culture, Art in America, Sept.
1989, at 39.
5. See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 Yale
L.J. 2087, 2092 (1991) [hereinafter Fiss, State Activism].
6. See Garvey, supra note 3, at 191.
7. See Michael Wingfield Walker, Artistic Freedom v. Censorship: The Aftermath
of the NEA's New Funding Restrictions, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 937, 937 (1993).
8. See Vance, supra note 4, at 39,41.
9. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
10. See 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998).
11. In an appropriately comic query, one scholar asked "[clan the Big Bad Wolf
really prevent Little Red Riding Hood from producing constitutionally protected
works of art just because he bought some of her paint and brushes?" Michael J.
Elston, Artists and Unconstitutional Conditions: The Big Bad Wolf Won't Subsidize
Little Red Riding Hood's Indecent Art, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1993, at 327,
331; see also Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free
Expression, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 543, 545 (1996) (proposing that judicial and scholarly
attempts to analyze the First Amendment protection of subsidized speech have been
confused and futile).
12. See Fiss, State Activism, supra note 5, at 2088 (arguing that the Supreme Court
has fashioned First Amendment jurisprudence to ensure that speech is rarely
criminalized).
13. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 152 (1996)
[hereinafter Post, Speech].
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have argued for greater protection. 4 The Supreme Court has failed to
implement any of the newly proposed methods for the First
Amendment analysis of subsidized speech.5
Traditionally, however, the Supreme Court has applied strong First
Amendment protection to the subsidized arena of schools. 6 The
Court has explained that protection is necessary to preserve the
educational role of schools in a democratic society. 7 The NEA's role
has been analogized to that of schools, in that both are vital to fueling
the ongoing public discourse that sustains a democracy. 8 NEA funds
liberate the arts "from strict dependence on the market or privately
controlled wealth and thus make an important contribution to
furthering the value that underlies the First Amendment: our right
and duty to govern ourselves reflectively and deliberately." 9 This
Note argues that despite the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Finley, the concomitant purposes of schools and the NEA mandate
that in order to preserve core First Amendment values, the First
Amendment must be applied to the NEA as stringently as it is to
schools. This Note concludes by offering a theoretical framework
within which to analyze the free speech protection that the NEA's
subsidized speech merits.
Part I begins by examining the establishment of the NEA in 1965.
By analyzing the language employed by the NEA's founders, this part
establishes the broad purpose of the Endowment to foster a "whole
range of artistic activity."' Part I then describes the organizational
structure of the NEA and concludes by detailing the Mapplethorpe
scandal and Congress's decision to alter the NEA's grant-making
criteria in response to the controversy. Part II outlines the doctrines
underlying First Amendment protection of free speech, focusing on
the specific category of governmentally subsidized speech. This part
explains how the Court's approach to such speech, employing analyses
of viewpoint discrimination and unconstitutional conditions, has been
14. See Fiss, State Activism, supra note 5, at 2097-98.
15. See Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment:
The New Frontier, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1103, 1112-14 (1995); David Cole, Beyond
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Fumded
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 680-81 (1992); Fiss, State Activism, supra note 5, at
2100-01; Post, Speech, supra note 13, at 152; Redish & Kessler, supra note 11, at 545.
16. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,835-37
(1995); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 261-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (asserting that the First Amendment will not
allow laws that "cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom").
18. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1473 (C.D.
Cal. 1992), affd, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Cole, supra
note 15, at 739.
19. Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 48 (1996) [hereinafter Fiss, Irony].
20. Establishing a National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, S. Rep. No.
89-300, at 2 (1965).
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unclear and inconsistent. Part III analyzes the Finley case itself, both
at the district court and the Supreme Court levels. This part points
out the failures of the Supreme Court's three contradictory opinions
by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter. Part IV proposes a novel
First Amendment approach by arguing that the NEA be classified
within a public-discourse category of subsidized speech and
recognized as a unique institution necessary to an enlightened
democracy. This part likens the function of the NEA to schools, a
subsidized arena that the First Amendment stringently protects. This
part then explains that the First Amendment should protect the NEA
to the same degree that it protects schools to safeguard the NEA's
role of engendering thought and enlightening our society, and to
prevent the NEA from being fashioned into a tool of indoctrination.
I. HISTORY OF THE NEA
On June 8, 1965, a Report from the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare21 proclaimed the establishment of the National
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities ("Foundation") and extolled
the creation of the NEA, a subpart of the Foundation.22 The Senate
Report described the principles and goals driving the NEA's
creation,23 and noted that its fundamental precept was that as an
economically developed country, the United States should strive to
cultivate the arts and humanities.24 This part describes the ideals
underlying the NEA's creation in more detail, and analyzes how these
ideals were put to the test by controversial grants that raised serious
First Amendment concerns in funding for the arts.
A. NEA Goals and Ideals
Congress established the NEA to provide grants and loans to
groups and individual artists.2 Using expansive language, the Senate
Report accompanying the NEA's enabling legislation laid out the
broad scope of the NEA's purpose and its vital role in American
culture. 6 Several statements in the Senate Report assert that the
21. This Report accompanied the legislation that created the NEA. See Pub. L.
No. 89-209, 79 Stat. 845 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997)), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186.
22. See S. Rep. No. 89-300, at 2. The Foundation, placed within the Executive
Branch, is comprised of the National Endowment for the Arts, the National
Endowment for the Humanities ("NEH"), and the Federal Council on the Arts and
the Humanities. The Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities oversees the
NEA and the NEH. See id.
23. See id. at 3-4.
24. See id. at 8-9.
25. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1994). The Chairperson is instructed to "give
particular regard to artists and artistic groups that have traditionally been
underrepresented." Id.
26. Quoting President Johnson, the Senate Report states that "[tIhis Congress will
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NEA was established to foster diversity and vigor of thought and
expression?3 The Foundation, through a "broadly conceived national
policy of support for the arts and humanities,"' 8 sought to encourage a
"whole range of artistic activity." 9
The NEA's imperative to enrich American cultural life as expressed
in the Senate Report emerges from a history of endeavors by
Presidents and members of Congress to increase national support for
the arts.30 In describing the background of the Bill, the Senate Report
begins by recounting President Washington's recognition of "the arts
as central to our national well-being."31 In 1891, Congress created the
National Conservatory of Music, which brought Anton Dvorak to
America.3 In 1909, Congress established the National Fine Arts
Commission with the purpose of encouraging the arts.3 Although
efforts to expand the national commitment to the arts repeatedly
failed, arts-supporters such as President Eisenhower continued to
assert the important role of the arts in American cultural life. He
declared that "In the advancement of the various activities which
would make our civilization endure and flourish, the Federal
Government should do more to give official recognition to the
importance of the arts and other cultural activities."3'
One year after President Kennedy had declared that "[i]f we are to
be among the leaders of the world in every sense of the word, [the
artistic] sector of our national life cannot be neglected or treated with
indifference," 35 Congress created a National Council on the Arts,
designed to advance federal support for the arts?' This organization
then became the NEA in the 1965 legislative enactment establishing
consider many programs which will leave an enduring mark on American life. But it
may well be that passage of this legislation, modest as it is, will help secure for this
Congress a sure and honored place in the story of the advance of our civilization." S.
Rep. No. 89-300, at 1. The Senate Report also asserts:
The humanities and arts are of central importance to our society and to
ourselves as individuals. They at once express and shape our thoughts ....
Our fulfillment as a Nation depends on the development of our minds; and
our relations to one another depend upon our understanding of one another
and of our society. The humanities and arts, therefore, are at the center of
our lives and are of prime importance to the Nation and to ourselves.
Id- at 7.
27. For example, the Senate Report states that "the intent of this act should be the
encouragement of free inquiry and expression." Id. at 4.
2& Id. at 2.
29. Id.
30. The Report includes a section on the historical background of governmental
support of the arts. See id. at 10-13.
31. Id. at 10.
32. See id
33. See id.
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id.
36. The Council was created on September 3, 1964. See id. at 12.
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the Foundation. 7 Concurrent with the Foundation's establishment,
President Johnson elaborated on President Kennedy's statement in
support of federal funding for the arts.3 8 President Johnson stated:
[G]overnment can seek to create conditions under which the arts
can flourish; through recognition of achievements, through helping
those who seek to enlarge creative understanding, through
increasing the access of our people to the works of our artists, and
through recognizing the arts as part of the pursuit of American
greatness.39
The Senate Report repeatedly asserts that as a grant-making vehicle
for the arts, the NEA should promote a free forum for uninhibited
and innovative expression."n From its outset, the NEA was specifically
intended not to impose restrictions on the manner of expression or to
dictate the form of thought that it would fund.41 The Senate Report
underscores that a primary function of the arts is to confront and to
expose the failures of society in an effort to enlighten the citizenry and
provoke thought.42 The imposition of majoritarian mores into grant-
making standards can thus serve to deny the legitimacy of unorthodox
thought, truncating the NEA's scope and fashioning it into a
mechanism of conformity.4 3
The Senate Report's language also reveals that the NEA was not
intended to be a vehicle of indoctrination." In its comments on
freedom of expression, the standards for judging an applicant's work
are specifically set out as "artistic and humanistic excellence." 4 It was
noted that although this is a subjective standard, "the committee
believes such a standard to be sufficiently identifiable to serve the
broad purpose of the act. '46 Underscoring the importance of diversity
of thought, the Senate Report states that "[t]he committee wishes to
37. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
38. See S. Rep. No. 89-300, at 13.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 3-4. The Senate Report states:
It is the intent of the committee that in the administration of this act there be
given the fullest attention to freedom of artistic and humanistic expression.
One of the artist's and the humanist's great values to society is the mirror of
self-examination which they raise so that society can become aware of its
shortcomings as well as its strengths.
Id. at 3; see also Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 682 (9th
Cir. 1996) (noting that even a brief look at the NEA's enabling statute reveals
Congress's intent to promote diversity of artistic expression), rev'd, 524 U.S. 569
(1998).
41. See S. Rep. No. 89-300, at 4.
42. See id. at 3 (likening the artist to a societal "mirror of self-examination").
43. See Cole, supra note 15, at 680-81 (explaining that a monopolized marketplace
of ideas may indoctrinate its audience).
44. See S. Rep. No. 89-300, at 4 (stating that conformity of thought is not
Congress's intent).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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make clear that conformity for its own sake is not to be encouraged,
and that no undue preference should be given to any particular style
or school of thought or expression."'47
As part of the explanation of why freedom of thought is vital to the
arts, the Senate Report draws a comparison between the role of arts
and schools in society.l Quoting President Kennedy, the Report
notes that "[j]ust as the Federal Government has not, should not, and
will not undertake to control the subject matter taught in local
schools, so its efforts should be confined to broad encouragement of
the arts."'49  The use of the word "broad"' s coupled with the
expansiveness of this statement indicates intent to urge the
government not to limit the manner and content of artistic expression.
Congress thus recognized that curbing the project of enlightenment
undertaken by the arts and schools negatively impacts the intellectual
vitality of American culture.
B. Structure of the NEA
As one of the three parts of the National Foundation on the Arts
and Humanities,52 the NEA administers a program of contracts,
grants-in-aid, and loans to individuals and organizations for projects
and productions.53 In 1992, for example, the NEA distributed a total
of $123 million in grants.- NEA proponents view these funds as seed
money that encourages private donations5 When the NEA was
founded in 1965, annual private contributions to the arts totaled
approximately $250 million, but by 1990, this figure had increased to
$6 billion.5 6 As a result of continued controversy over its scope and
purpose, the NEA's budget was drastically reduced from $162 million
in 1995 to $99 million in 1996.1
47. Id.
48. See id. at 11-12.
49. Ild.
50. See id.
51. This correlation is explained infra Part IV.
52. The NEH promotes the humanities by, among other things, encouraging a
national policy of scholarship, fostering international exchanges, supporting scholarly
research, fostering understanding and appreciation of the humanities, and promoting
the publication of scholarly works. See 20 U.S.C. § 956(c) (1994).
53. See id § 954(c).
54. See Dawn Best, Drastic Funding Cuts Proposed for the National Endowment
for the Arts: The Necessary Limitation of Entertainment for the Cultural Elite or tie
Sabotage of the Sustenance of National Culture?, 6 DePaul J. Art & Ent. L 73, 77
(1995). In 1991, the NEA distributed $153 million to 4453 grants from a selection of
17,879 applications. See Raleigh Douglas Herbert, National Endowment for the Arts-
The Federal Government's Funding of the Arts and the Decency Clause-20 U.S.C. §
954(d)(1) (1990), 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 413,414 n.12 (1993).
55. See Best, supra note 54, at 77.
56. See Nancy Coyle, Towards a More Secure Future: Reauthorization of the
National Endowment for the Arts, 8 DePaul J. Art & Ent. L 349,352 (1998).
57. See The NEA Website (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <httpJ/www.arts.endow.gov/
1999]
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The NEA consists of twenty members of the National Council on
the Arts, all under the leadership of the Chairperson of the NEA.58
The Chairperson and the members of the Council are appointed by
the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."59
Although eligible for reappointment, the Chairperson's term in office
is four years.' The National Council on the Arts, which is a subpart
of the NEA,61 is comprised of the Chairperson of the NEA, who is
also the Chairperson of the National Council on the Arts, 2 five
members of Congress who serve in an ex-officio, non-voting
capacity,63 and fourteen private citizens of the United States.6 In
selecting members of the Council, the President shall seek out those
"recognized for their broad knowledge of, or expertise in, or for their
profound interest in the arts [and those who] have established records
of distinguished service, or achieved eminence, in the arts."'6  The
term of office for the members appointed by the President is six
years.6
The Council's purpose is to advise and recommend to the
Chairperson those applications for funding that demonstrate "artistic
excellence and artistic merit."'67 Although the Chairperson has final
approval of applications for funding, the application must first receive
the Council's recommendation for approval and its designation of a
fiscal amount of aid for each project.68 In order to receive funding,
artists fill out applications for financial assistance that describe the
proposed project and the timetable for its completion, and assure that
they will comply with certain conditions for receipt of financial
assistance.69
As of 1990, in giving final approval to an application, the
Chairperson "shall ensure that.., artistic excellence and artistic merit
are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
learnlFacts/Appropriations2.html>.
58. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(b)(1); id. § 955(b) (Supp. III 1997).
59. Id. § 954(b)(1) (1994); id. § 955(b)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1997).
60. See id. § 954(b)(2) (1994).
61. See id. § 955(a) (1994).
62- See id. § 955(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1997).
63. These five members are comprised of: two members of the House of
Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House; one member of the House of
Representatives appointed by the Minority Leader of the House; one Senator
appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate; and one Senator appointed by the
Minority Leader of the Senate. See id. § 955(b)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1997). Their terms in
office are two years. See id
64. See id. § 955(b)(1)(C)(i) (Supp. III 1997).
65. Id.
66. See id. § 955(c) (Supp. III 1997). The term of office for the Chairperson,
however, is four years. See id. § 954(b)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
67. Id. § 955(0(1) (Supp. III 1997).
68. See id. § 955(0 (Supp. III 1997).
69. See id. § 954(i) (Supp. III 1997).
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beliefs and values of the American public. '70  This "decency
provision" was inserted as a result of the NEA's funding of two highly
controversial artists.7' These funding choices caused a nationwide
scandal and raised public concern over the use of federal funds for the
arts. 2 The next section explores this controversy.
C. Grants That Sparked a Controversy
1. The Mapplethorpe Imbroglio
Trouble began for the NEA in 1989 when it subsidized a traveling
exhibition that included Andres Serrano's photograph "Piss Christ."
The photograph depicts a plastic crucifix submerged in a jar of the
artist's urine.73 Serrano, along with nine other artists, had been
selected from 500 applicants to receive grants of $15,000 made by the
Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art ("SECCA") in Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, in order to appear in a show titled "Awards in
the Visual Arts 7."74 SECCA itself received $75,000 from the NEA
for its annual visual arts competition.75
The NEA's role in funding the public display of "Piss Christ" was
brought to Congress's attention by the American Family Association,
based in Tupelo, Mississippi. 6 The Association encouraged readers of
its newsletter to protest the funding to their representatives in
Congress.' In response to a flood of letters, Congress was soon
debating the future of the NEA.' Leading the effort to impose
accountability on the NEA, Senators Jesse Helms and Alphonse
D'Amato vociferously denounced Serrano's work,'9 expressing horror
that the NEA had subsidized a "so-called piece of art [that] is a
deplorable, despicable display of vulgarity."' ' Advancing his crusade
against the NEA, Senator Helms wrote that "these examples of so-
70. Id. § 954(d) (Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added).
71. See infra Part I.C.1. Perhaps the "decency clause" has set a political precedent
to be emulated by local conservative politicians. Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of New
York City, has recently threatened to cut funding to the Brooklyn Museum for
showing an exhibit entitled "Sensation" that includes works the Mayor perceives as
sacrilegious. See Peter Schjeldahl, Those Nasty Brits, The New Yorker, Oct. 11, 1999,
at 104; Michael Tomasky, Law & Ordure, New York, Oct. 11, 1999, at 26.
72. See Donald W. Hawthorne, Subversive Subsidization. How NEA Art Funding
Abridges Private Speech, 40 U. Kan. L Rev. 437, 438-41 (1992) (arguing that the
decency clause is unconstitutional because NEA funding is widespread and thus limits
private expression through the denial of funding).
73. See Vance, supra note 4, at 39.
74. See id.
75. See Herbert, supra note 54, at 415.
76. See Vance, supra note 4, at 39.
77. See Garvey, supra note 3, at 190-91.
7& See id. at 191.
79. See id
80. 135 Cong. Rec. 9788 (1989) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
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called 'works of art' are offensive to the majority of Americans who
are decent, moral people .... [S]uch gratuitous insults to the religious
and moral sensibilities of fellow citizens contribute to the erosion of
civil comity and democratic tolerance .... 81
Meanwhile, another NEA grant of $30,000 was awarded to the
Institute for Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania,
which used the funds to organize a retrospective exhibition of Robert
Mapplethorpe's photographs.' In July 1989, the exhibit was
scheduled to appear at the Corcoran Gallery of Art in Washington,
D.C.83 A gay New York photographer, Mapplethorpe had met with
much success before his death from AIDS in 1989 at the age of forty-
two." The exhibition included 175 photographs featuring a variety of
images, including photographs of celebrities, portraits of
Mapplethorpe himself, and pictures of flowers, children (including
one of a young naked girl with her dress raised), and gay sex. 5 In the
face of a burgeoning controversy over NEA funding, the Corcoran
Gallery cancelled the show, which was entitled "Robert
Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Moment."86  When news of the
cancellation became public, a full-fledged cultural war erupted7
Many taxpayers urged their state and local politicians to abolish the
NEA, or to prevent the agency from funding offensive art." The
debate polarized between NEA supporters who believed that
restrictions on speech were a patent form of censorship, and NEA
critics who argued that their tax dollars should not be used to fund
offensive artwork. 9 As one commentator noted, the attack on the
NEA circumvented the obstacle of censorship through a "rhetorical
disavowal of censorship per se and the cultivation of an artfully
crafted distinction between absolute censorship and the denial of
public funding. ' 90
2. Eradicating "Filth:" A Senator Takes the Helm
Congress reacted to the public clamor by endeavoring to reduce the
NEA's budget and to amend the NEA's enabling statute. In 1989, an
amendment was enacted that altered the appropriations bill for fiscal
81. Jesse Helms, Is it Art or Tax-Paid Obscenity? The NEA Controversy, 2 J.L. &
Pol'y 99, 100 (1994).
82. See Garvey, supra note 3, at 190.
83. See id.
84. See Fiss, State Activism, supra note 5, at 2089.
85. See id.
86. See Kresse, supra note 4, at 234.
87. See Vance, supra note 4, at 39.
88. "This is an outrage, and our people's tax dollars should not support this trash,
and we should not be giving it the dignity." 135 Cong. Rec. 9788 (1989) (statement of
Sen. D'Amato).
89. See Vance, supra note 4, at 41.
90. Id.
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1990.91 Although Dana Rohrabacher's proposal of a 100% budget cut
was defeated,' Charles Stenholm's proposal to reduce the NEA
budget by exactly $45,000 passed.93 This amendment symbolically
disavowed the funding of the Mapplethorpe and Serrano exhibits by
decreasing the NEA's budget by the precise amount expended for
their access to the public.9
Senator Jesse Helms vociferously insisted that the funding, and ergo
the prominence, of the NEA in our cultural scheme be drastically
reduced.95 He led the movement in Congress to impose content
restrictions upon the grant-making criteria of the NEA.9 Arguing
that "the majority of American citizens surely did not approve of
Mapplethorpe's homoerotic photographs or of Serrano's picture of a
crucifix submerged in a bottle of his urine and, accordingly, that the
citizens of this country did not have to support such 'art," '91 Senator
Helms introduced another amendment two weeks after the initial
budget cut.98
Aiming to weed out homoerotic and anti-Christian art, the
Amendment stated:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this
Act may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce-
(1) obscene or indecent materials, including but not limited to
depictions of sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, the exploitation of
children, or individuals engaged in sex acts; or
(2) material which denigrates the objects or beliefs of the
adherents of a particular religion or non-religion; or
(3) material which denigrates, debases, or reviles a person,
group, or class of citizens on the basis of race, creed, sex, handicap,
age, or national origin.99
Passed quickly on a voice vote, this Amendment was then forwarded
to an Independent Committee created to study the NEA's grant-
making criteria.'0
Many critics of the NEA asserted that the Endowment should be
abolished in its entirety.11 An article in Policy Review claimed that
91. See 135 Cong. Rec. 14,429-30 (1989) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
92. See id. at 14,432-38, 14,441.
93. This Amendment passed on a vote of 361 to 65. See id. at 14,440-49, see also
Kresse, supra note 4, at 235 n.19.
94. See Garvey, supra note 3, at 192; Vance, supra note 4, at 41.
95. See Vance, supra note 4, at 41.
96. See Kresse, supra note 4, at 235-36.
97. Bollinger, supra note 15, at 1104.
9& See 135 Cong. Rec. 16,276 (1989).
99. Id.
100. See Garvey, supra note 3, at 193-94.
101. A few proponents of the arts have also argued that the NEA should be
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the government should not patronize artists, for this can only be done
by monarchs, and "republican values in America forbade such royal
favors as a matter of principle.""° Although the claim is valid that art
can develop within a society based purely on the contributions and
tastes of private patrons and the forces of the market, it does not
reflect the national cultural agenda embodied in the NEA. The
premise of the Policy Review article is based partly on the difficulty of
defining contemporary art and recognizing what constitutes great
artistic achievement: "The brouhaha at the NEA obscures, by the
very outlandishness of the works rewarded, that even in the most
trustworthy and mature hands, ascertaining the value of contemporary
art is fiendishly difficult."1 The difficulty of the NEA's task aside,
the notion that contemporary art cannot be effectively judged for
merit, is baseless. Inbred into this type of claim is an innate
conservatism toward judging the quality of art. This conservatism
clings to the values of art's "modern period" and is inimical to what
the NEA does: distribute funds in part to the avant-garde to
encourage creative expression)°4
Ultimately, Senator Helms's amendment was severely edited,
leaving only a prohibition against obscenity, modeled after the test set
forth in Miller v. California,105 and a specific disallowance against
"sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, the sexual exploitation of children,
or [depictions of] sex acts."1 6 To effectively carry out this directive,
the NEA required all prospective recipients of awards to certify, in
advance, that they would not use their award money to promote
works that fall into one of the proscribed categories)Y7 Congress's
"abolished for the good of artistic excellence in America, especially post-modem,
homoerotic, and other types of avant-garde art." Priya Sara Cherian, Promoting the
Arts by Dissolving the National Endowment for the Arts, Comment, 4 U. Chi. L. Sch.
Roundtable 129, 129 (1997) (arguing that perpetuation of the NEA may force art to
remain in the modem period, in which the excellence of art can be judged more
objectively than in the postmodern era).
102. Andr6 Ryerson, Abolish the NEA-Government Is Incapable of Detecting
Artistic Genius, Policy Review, Fall 1990, at 32, 32, reprinted in 137 Cong. Rec. 23,466
(1991).
103. Id. at 34.
104. See Cherian, supra note 101, at 133-34.
105. 413 U.S. 15, 23-34 (1973). See infra note 134 for a description of the Miller test.
106. 135 Cong. Rec. 22,835 (1989). The edited amendment stated:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National
Endowment for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities
may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in thejudgment of the National Endowment for the Arts or the National
Endowment for the Humanities may be considered obscene, including but
not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, the sexual
exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.
Id.
107. See Walker, supra note 7, at 937.
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delineation of various categories of unsuitable expression soon came
under attack.'08
Asserting that the certification requirement would have a chilling
effect on artistic expression, a California district court declared the
requirement unconstitutional in Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v.
Frohnmayer.19 The court held that the statutory requirement that an
artist agree not to engage in certain forms of expression violated the
First Amendment." 0 Plaintiffs in this case were the Bella Lewitzky
Dance Foundation and the Newport Harbor Art Museum."' Both
groups had received grants from the NEA in the past and were
notified that they would again be receiving funds.112 When the
plaintiffs objected to the certification of compliance with the statutory
standards, the NEA informed them that their grants would be
reversed without the required certification.113 Repeating an expansive
theme of our First Amendment doctrine, 14 the court found that the
broad scope of the statute had a chilling effect on prospective grant
recipients that would cause them to avoid creating works that might
be deemed obscene by the NEA.n 5 Yet even before the obstacle
created by Frohnmayer, Congress was again steeped in debate over
NEA funding during the 1990 reauthorization.
16
3. A Bipartisan "Solution"
In 1990, the Congressional debate resumed in the NEA
reauthorization proceedings, only one year after it had erupted for the
first time during the Endowment's fiscal appropriation bill."' The
dispute in Congress now focused not only on the symbolic nature of
Mapplethorpe and Serrano's photographs, but more expansively on
the purpose of the NEA and the role that it plays constitutionally and
ideologically within our culture. Senator Helms advanced the most
conservative anti-NEA sentiment. Describing the Seranno and
Maplethorpe works that ignited the controversy, he insisted that his
use of the term artist be put in quotations, because "in my judgment
10& See J. Sarah Kim, Comment, Defending the "Decency Clause" in Finley v.
National Endowment for the Arts, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ. 627,
632-34 (1993).
109. 754 F. Supp. 774,785 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
110. See i.
111. See id. at 775.
112- See id. at 776-78.
113. See id. at 777.
114. Cf New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300-01 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (finding that Alabama libel laws have a chilling effect on First
Amendment freedoms).
115. See Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 783.
116. The NEA must be reauthorized every three to five years, and its 1985
reauthorization happened to expire in 1990. See Garvey, supra note 3, at 203.
117. See id.
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they are anything but artists.""' 8 Senator Helms assessed the merit of
the disputed artwork as "so rotten, so crude, so disgusting, so filthy,
that it turns the stomach of any normal person."11 9 He viewed
Mapplethorpe and Seranno as attendant to a collective endeavor "by
a group of people who are in a lifelong battle to destroy the Judeo-
Christian foundations of this Republic," which must, according to
Senator Helms, be stopped. 20 While in Senator Helms's view the
American public may "resent the use of their taxes to subsidize and
promote filth,"'' his attempts to fund only "clean" art run afoul of the
First Amendment, which declares that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech."'22
In the Congressional debates, Senator Moynihan represented the
opposing viewpoint and chastised his peers:
What is the matter with us? Are we afraid of painting, sculpture,
book reviews? Or do we think the American people are so different
than they were in the time of John F. Kennedy that they no longer
support the arts and the humanities? Does art intimidate us? Do
books frighten us? Does opinion seem inappropriate to us?
1
'
3
Senator Moynihan, who was present at the founding of the NEA,
related that at that time some members of Congress had reservations
about the NEA because they foresaw that there would be "conflicts
over values" somewhere down the road.124  Their pessimistic
prediction had finally been proven correct. Senator Moynihan added
a global perspective to the 1990 debate: "All over the world
governments are getting out of thought control, and by some perverse
process, the U.S. Senate is beginning to cite that there is a correct
form of Republican art and a correct form of Democratic literary
criticism. I think it is nuts."'1 The sentiments of Senators Moynihan
and Helms seemed to find a middle ground, which was legislated in
the 1990 reauthorization.
Largely reliant upon an Independent Committee that was
established during the 1989 allocation debate to evaluate the NEA's
118. 137 Cong. Rec. 23,464 (1991) (statement of Sen. Helms).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 23,465. Senator Helms also expressed alarm:
[A]bout the assault on America's basic values by self-proclaimed, self-
appointed, perverted artists who insist upon assaulting the moral sensibilities
of the American people by using the taxpayers' money to promote and
subsidize rotten, disgusting material designed to promote homosexuality-
with the aim of having it accepted as just another lifestyle. Well, it is not just
another lifestyle.
Id. at 23,464.
121. Id.
122. U.S. Const. amend. I.
123. 137 Cong. Rec. 23,458 (1991) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
124. Id. at 23,459 (quoting Senator Patrick Moynihan, Address at the Juliard
School Commencement (May 17, 1991)).
125. Id. at 23,458.
[Vol. 68
SUBSIDIZED ART AFTER FINLEY
grant-making criteria,' the House adopted the Williams-Coleman
substitute for the reauthorization bill.l Allowing the NEA to survive
while imposing some accountability on the Endowment, the Williams-
Coleman substitute was hailed as a triumph of the bipartisan process
at work as it marked a compromise between conservative and liberal
agendas."2 However, it included the notorious "decency clause" that
was eventually challenged and ultimately upheld by the Supreme
Court in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley."2 Although the
enactment of the "decency clause" and Finley's constitutional seal of
approval may have quieted the NEA debate temporarily, an entirely
new controversy ensued over the government's latitude in dictating
the terms and content of subsidized speech. To properly understand
the impact of Finley's holding, Part II presents a background on First
Amendment principles and describes the doctrines underlying the
protection of subsidized speech.
II. THE DISORDERLY DOCTRINES OF SUBSIDIZED SPEECH
The Constitution broadly proclaims that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."13 This
expansive protection principle has been narrowed judicially, and now
excludes various "low-value" categories of expression.1 31 Traditional
First Amendment doctrine thus protects an individual's speech unless
it falls into one of several "low-value" categories, including advocacy
of illegal action, 32 fighting words," obscenity,13 and defamation.13 5 In
126. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 575 (1998);
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
127. See 136 Cong. Rec. 29,243-44 (1990).
128. See id at 29,243.
129. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
130. U.S. Const. amend I.
131. See, eg., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1982) (establishing child
pornography as a category of speech outside First Amendment protection); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (creating a three-part test to define obscenity that
can be constitutionally prohibited); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1973) (asserting that a state may prohibit the display of pornographic material if the
prohibition is based on a morally neutral concern about public safety in the
neighborhood); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a state
may only prohibit speech when the speaker advocates illegal action, intends to
effectuate such action, and there exists a likelihood that the action will be incited);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (finding illegal statements
that are likely to cause a violent reaction from the average addressee).
132- See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444. In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court set
forth a test by which the advocacy of illegal action should be judged in light of the
First Amendment's expansive speech-protection principle. See id. at 447-48. The test
states:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id at 447.
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determining whether to create, narrow, or expand one of these
unprotected speech arenas, the Supreme Court has generally weighed
the value of the speech against its potential for harm.36 In the context
of subsidized speech, the Court has articulated First Amendment
protection much less clearly. This part will analyze subsidized speech
and the doctrines employed by the Supreme Court in applying its
protections, including viewpoint discrimination and unconstitutional
conditions.
First Amendment doctrine within the realm of government-
subsidized speech has evolved less forthrightly than approaches to
non-funded private speech.137  Speech is subsidized when it is
supported by government funds, as in the case of direct government
employment, federal aid to hospitals, or national subsidization of
schools. 138  In the realm of private speech, the government acts
primarily as a regulator, determining what boundaries it will impose
upon an individual's right to speak. 39 But subsidized speech places
133. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court upheld a
conviction under a state statute that prohibited face-to-face words likely to cause a
fight. See id. at 573. The fighting words doctrine was later limited by Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the Supreme Court overturned a conviction
under a disturbing-the-peace statute of a man who wore a jacket declaring "Fuck the
Draft." See id. at 16-17. Determining that the State has no right to sanitize public
discourse, the Court asserted that the populace must endure some offensive language
intermingled with protected First Amendment speech. See id. at 24-25.
134. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 16. In Miller, the Supreme Court determined when
local legislators may proscribe sexual expression by creating an obscenity standard:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
In Miller, the appellant was convicted of violating California Penal Code § 311.2(a)
for knowingly distributing unsolicited obscene materials. See id. at 16-18. The
advertising brochures primarily consisted of explicit drawings and pictures of sexual
acts, with "genitals often prominently displayed." Id. at 18. Noting the difficulty of
defining obscenity, the Court attempted to forge a workable definition that would
adequately protect the First Amendment interest in freedom of speech. See id. at 19-
20. The Court hailed this definition as a successful measure to distinguish "hard core"
pornography from constitutionally protected speech. See id. at 29.
135. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (imposing First
Amendment standards onto the common law of libel because "libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations").
136. See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (implementing a balancing test that
weighs the benefit of the speech against the interest in order and morality).
137. See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights
in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1298 (1984) (noting that the Court has
never adopted a coherent framework for analyzing subsidized speech); Post, Speech,
supra note 13, at 152 (noting the Supreme Court's haphazard approach to subsidized
speech).
138. See Kreimer, supra note 137, at 1295-96.
139. See Fiss, Irony, supra note 19, at 80.
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the government in the role of allocator.1/ In that role, the
government does not criminalize a particular message, but rather
chooses which speech it will pay for and which speech will be denied
funding.'4' As one commentator notes, jurisprudential confusion
thrives in the category of subsidized speech because "the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the First Amendment applies to the
affirmative as well as the negative modes of exercising state power,
but it has encountered great difficulty in specifying exactly how it
applies.' 142
Government-funded speech presents a myriad of categorizational
problems that have not been consistently delineated by the Supreme
Court. 143 When the state is inhibiting the speech of an individual, such
as silencing a soapbox orator, it is regulating the individual speaker's
autonomy.'" The First Amendment tradition has largely developed
into a framework to prevent the state from inhibiting unpopular
speech. 45 As a result, jurisprudence has fashioned the First
Amendment into a tool of classical liberalism.'6 The ideas embedded
in the liberalist theory'47 of the First Amendment prohibit the direct
regulation of minority voices and unorthodox views."4  First
Amendment theory, however, fails to provide adequate safeguards for
unpopular ideas voiced through government-funded speech when the
140. Because the government's allocative role has increased with "its inheritance of
educational and welfare functions from the church and family, opportunities abound
for governmental intrusion through allocation of benefits." Kreimer, supra note 137,
at 1296.
141. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
837 (1995) (invalidating a university guideline that proscribed the subsidization of
student groups that engaged in religious activities); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,203
(1991) (upholding a regulation that denied Title X funds to medical clinics that
discussed or promoted abortion).
142. Fiss, State Activism, supra note 5, at 2088.
143. See Post, Speech, supra note 13, at 152 (positing that the Supreme Court has
relied on the doctrines of unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint discrimination
rather than addressing issues of the social characterization of subsidized speech).
144. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (asserting that the First
Amendment protects both the manner and the content of an individual's speech). In
Cohen, the Court determined that the defendant's right to speak could be curbed only
in the presence of "an intent to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft." Id.
at 18.
145. In Cohen, the Court declared that "verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance" are the "necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the
process of open debate permits us to achieve." Id. at 24-25.
146. See Fiss, Irony, supra note 19, at 28; Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1413 (1986) (stating that since "[c]lassical liberalism
presupposes a sharp dichotomy between state and citizen," it espouses freedom
through limited government).
147. One definition of liberalism is "an attitude or philosophy favoring individual
freedom for self-development and self-expression." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1303 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986).
14& See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (asserting that the
First Amendment is committed to preserving the marketplace of ideas).
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state is acting as allocator.149 The next two sections will explain the
doctrines of viewpoint discrimination and unconstitutional conditions
as applied to subsidized speech. Although these doctrines are
employed unpredictably by the Supreme Court, they comprise the two
primary analytical vehicles invoked to analyze the permissibility of the
regulation of subsidized speech.
A. Viewpoint Discrimination
The Supreme Court has stated that legislation may not be "'aimed
at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 150  Eliminating dangerous
ideas from public debate constitutes impermissible viewpoint
discrimination and stultifies the national discourse.151 Government
action that prohibits speech based on its viewpoint threatens to
undermine fundamental First Amendment values such as freedom of
thought, intellectual growth, a robust interchange of ideas, and the
ability to self-govern. 152 Because of this threat against core First
Amendment values, viewpoint discrimination will be allowed "upon
only 'the most exacting [judicial] scrutiny.' 153
The doctrine of viewpoint discrimination is invoked to protect both
private speech and subsidized speech. 154  First Amendment
jurisprudence categorizes viewpoint discrimination, as well as subject
149. See Cole, supra note 15, at 680-81 (stating that the neutrality mandate for
direct prohibitions on speech ought to be incorporated into analyses of subsidized
speech).
150. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958), quoting American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)); see, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-97 (1993) (finding that a school's refusal to allow
religious organizations access to its facilities to engage in expression constitutes
impermissible viewpoint discrimination); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (asserting that a school's compulsory flag salute
stamps out dissent and unconstitutionally prescribes orthodoxy), rev'g Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
151. See Laura V. Farthing, Note, Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland: The
Limits of Content Discrimination Analysis, 78 Geo. L.J. 1949, 1953 (1990) (asserting
that the threefold threatened interests of the First Amendment are "the preservation
of free debate in order to promote self-government; the safeguarding of the individual
and the communal search for truth; and the guarantee of the individual's right to free
expression").
152. See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 Hastings Const. L.Q. 99, 100
(1996) (asserting that viewpoint discrimination unconstitutionally skews the public
debate).
153. Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in
America, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1135, 1172 (1994) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 321 (1988)).
154. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) (declaring a city
ordinance selectively proscribing the display of signs on residential property to be
impermissibly underinclusive); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (asserting
that California's oath requirement as a condition for obtaining a tax exemption
discriminates against dangerous ideas).
[Vol. 68
SUBSIDIZED ART AFTER FINLEY
matter discrimination, as specific forms of content discrimination.'
The Court implements a functional test to determine whether a
regulation is content-based."5 6 If regulators consider the content of
the speech, such as political picketing as opposed to all picketing, in
determining whether the expression falls into the proscribed category,
then the legislation is content-based.' In Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley, s Justice Marshall broadly proclaimed the
censorial dangers of content control.59 Stating that a "restriction on
expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut
the 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"' the
Court invalidated a city ordinance that prohibited all picketing other
than peaceful labor picketing within 150 feet of a school.'t 0
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,6' the Supreme Court explained that
content discrimination consists of either subject matter discrimination
or viewpoint discrimination.'6 Subject matter discrimination
prohibits discussion of an entire subject area.'6 Although both forms
of content discrimination are presumptively invalid and tested under a
strict scrutiny standard, viewpoint discrimination is more pernicious
and subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.16' While subject matter
discrimination is tested under a traditional strict scrutiny analysis,
which requires that the government regulation must be a "precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest,"' viewpoint
discrimination is subjected to an additional least-restrictive-
alternatives analysis."6 Under this analysis, if there is an alternative
content-neutral means of achieving the state's interest, then the
regulation is determined to be unconstitutionally viewpoint based. 67
155. See Eberle, supra note 153, at 1171.
156. See Farthing, supra note 151, at 1960.
157. See id.
158. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
159. See id. at 96.
160. See id. at 96, 102.
161. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
162. See id. at 391; see also Eberle, supra note 153, at 1171.
163. See Farthing, supra note 151, at 1964.
164. See id. at 1960-61 (stating that by intending to disadvantage or promote a
specific opinion, viewpoint discrimination is the most dangerous type of content-
based regulation); Robert L. Waring, Wide Awake or Half-Asleep? Revelations from
Jurisprudential Tailings Found in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 17 N. ill. U.
L. Rev. 223,232-33 (1997) (noting that viewpoint discrimination is a highly pernicious
form of content discrimination).
165. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)
(citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)). The strict scrutiny test
has also been described as requiring that a regulation be "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,231 (1987).
166. See Eberle, supra note 153, at 1171.
167. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (invalidating a hate-
speech ordinance because a statute that did not single out disfavored topics could
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Viewpoint neutrality must be maintained in the context of
government subsidies because of "the dangers inherent in permitting
the state to suppress critical and dissenting ideas through
manipulation of its myriad benefit programs."1" One exception to
this rule is when the government itself is speaking and has not created
a realm for individual speech.169 Under these circumstances, "there is
no pretense that a forum has been created for diverse ideas, or indeed
for any speech by citizens."1 0 This exception does not apply when the
government funds individual speech that lies within the public
discourse, in which case prohibitions against content and viewpoint
discrimination attach.171
B. Unconstitutional Conditions
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine'72 is the second doctrine
the Supreme Court uses to analyze restrictions on subsidized
speech. 73 The doctrine reasons that there are certain conditions that
the government may not place on the receipt of funds because
imposing such conditions would violate a cherished right and thus
render the condition unconstitutional. 74 Cherished rights include
fundamental freedoms such as the right to criticize the government. 17
One explanation offered for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
states that "some constitutional rights are inalienable, and therefore
may not be surrendered even through voluntary exchange. ' 176  An
early decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Townsend v.
Townsend 177 praised the special status of constitutional rights.178 The
court declared that "Constitutional rights are vested, unexchangeable,
and unalienable. They belong to posterity as well as to the present
serve the state's interest).
168. Heins, supra note 152, at 104.
169. See id. at 150.
170. Id.
171. See Post, Speech, supra note 13, at 155.
172. One scholar has explained:
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not
grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit
altogether. It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do
indirectly what it may not do directly over the view that the greater power to
deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1415
(1989).
173. See Cole, supra note 15, at 679-80.
174. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987);
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 359-60 (1976); Sullivan, supra note 172, at 1421-22, 1476-77.
175. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402.
176. Sullivan, supra note 172, at 1476-77.
177. 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1 (1821); see also Kreimer, supra note 137, at 1302.
178. See Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) at 10; see also Kreimer, supra note 137, at 1302.
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generation. We may use and enjoy, but not transfer them; and every
such condition is utterly void." 79
In contrast, an early analysis of the First Amendment protections
afforded to subsidized speech found that a speaker relinquished his
freedom of speech when he entered into the government's employ.16
In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,81 Justice Holmes maintained
that a police officer's constitutional right to voice his opinions is
waived as part of his employment.tm Without entering into an
analysis of the First Amendment, Holmes declared that a police
officer "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman."'' 3 Holmes's tenet, however,
has been undermined by the subsequent development of First
Amendment doctrine and the Supreme Court's adoption of an
intermediate position through the assertion of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine."
An earlier approach to the unconstitutional conditions analysis was
the greater-includes-the-lesser theory, which was articulated and
ultimately rejected in cases involving commercial speech.',, In
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,' r8 the Supreme
Court utilized the greater-includes-the-lesser argument to uphold a
restriction on casino advertising.1 7 Employing a four-part test,1ss the
Court held that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling
necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino
gambling.' '1 s9
179. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) at 10; see also Kreimer, supra note 137, at 1302.
180. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892)
(holding that by entering into employment with the government, a police officer
suspends his First Amendment rights).
181. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
182 See i. at 517-18.
183. Id. at 517.
184. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,197 (1991).
185. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,489 (1996) (holding that
the power to prohibit the sale of liquor does not include the power to ban accurate
and nonmisleading alcohol advertisements); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co.,
478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (holding that because the government may prohibit
gambling, it may also restrict gambling advertisement).
186. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
187. See id. at 348.
188. The four-part test for the prohibition of commercial speech emerged from
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980). The test states:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
id.
189. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
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A speech restriction similar to that allowed in Posadas was deemed
unconstitutional in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.19" This case
involved a Rhode Island prohibition against advertisements
containing the retail prices of alcohol.191 The Court overturned
Posadas's greater-includes-the-lesser argument, 192 stating that "a state
legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful,
nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes." 19,
Although the greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine, which stemmed
from Justice Holmes's premise in McAuliffe, has been defeated by the
44 Liquornart opinion,194 "the ghost of Justice Holmes's greater and
lesser argument continues to brood over much constitutional
analysis"195 in Justice Rehnquist's penalty/subsidy distinction. In
Regan v. Taxation with Representation,196 the Court determined that
because the Constitution does not require the government to
subsidize speech, it can do so selectivelyY97  Taxation with
Representation involved the denial of nonprofit tax status to groups
engaged in lobbying activities.1 98 In determining that the denial of
nonprofit status was not a penalty, Justice Rehnquist's opinion
"assumed a baseline of no subsidy for lobbying activities (in which
case there is tautologically no penalty), rather than subsidy for all
nonprofit activities (in which case the exclusion of the lobbying strand
of those activities resembles a penalty). ' 99
The penalty/nonsubsidy distinction is arbitrary because "the
characterization of a condition as a 'penalty' or as a 'nonsubsidy'
depends on the baseline from which one measures.""° An example of
this occurs in Taxation with Representation, in which the Court began
with a baseline assumption of nonsubsidy for tax exemption to
190. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
191. See id. at 489.
192. See id. at 513.
193. Id. at 510.
194. See id.
195. See Kreimer, supra note 137, at 1308.
196. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
197. See id. at 546.
198. See id. at 542 & n.1.
199. Sullivan, supra note 172, at 1441.
200. Id. at 1436.
Excessive focus on whether unconstitutional conditions are coercive, and
thus "penalize" rights, has obscured the field.... "[Cloercion" in this
context is a conclusory label masquerading as analysis. Constitutional
reasoning here lags behind the recognition, in both philosophy and private
law, that coercion in the absence of physical compulsion or force is not an
empirical concept but a normative one that necessarily refers to values lying
beyond the value of autonomy itself.
Id. at 1505-06; see also Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free
Expression? First Amendment Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the
Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 353, 383 (1995) (arguing that the
absence of uniformity in distinguishing between a penalty and nonsubsidy had yielded
unpredictable case-by-case determinations).
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political lobbying groups such that they could not receive the tax
benefit without curbing their speech to eliminate lobbying. Other
charitable organizations, however, enjoy the baseline assumption of a
subsidy through tax exempt status, so that restrictions on their speech
would be classified as a penalty.2  The logic underpinning this
distinction is that the government's funds merely facilitate additional
speech, and do not prohibit anyone from paying to project their own
speech202
In Rust v. Sullivan,'.3 Justice Rehnquist' again espoused a
distinction between permissible nonsubsidies and impermissable
penalties as part of the unconstitutional conditions analysis, and this
distinction continues to this day.m The penalty/nonsubsidy analysis
echoes the greater-includes-the-lesser argument that the Court has
since rejected in 44 Liquormart.' In Rust, the Court upheld a
regulation that prohibited facilities that received Title X funds from
discussing the possibility of abortion with their clients, primarily
indigent women. The doctors in this case were even forbidden from
referring their clients to independent clinics that could counsel
patients on the prospects of abortion.m The Court determined that
the Constitution did not prevent the government from selectively
erasing the content of subsidized speech, even if such content related
to a matter of constitutional rights. Justice Rehnquist asserted that
money granted to Title X clinics was much like a gift from the
government.210 Starting with a baseline understanding of no right to
financial assistance, the Court upheld a condition that reduced
discussion on the issue of a constitutionally protected right, namely a
201. See Sullivan, supra note 172, at 1441.
202. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1991). The penalty/nonsubsidy
distinction has yielded confused results and "seems no more helpful than its other
attempts to use coercion as the ordering principle of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine." Sullivan, supra note 172, at 1442. Although the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine has attempted to identify conditions that limit human autonomy as coercive,
"[c]oercion is a judgment, not a state of being." Id. at 1450.
203. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
204. "Justice Rehnquist is the legatee of the doctrine used by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis in their efforts to immunize social legislation from judicial review, while
Justice Brennan wields an analysis forged by Justices Sutherland and Day in their
attempts to contain the growth of government regulation of corporate interests."
Kreimer, supra note 137, at 1299 (footnote omitted).
205. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-93. The ideology behind penalty/nonsubsidy
distinction was developed in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969), Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963), and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19
(1958).
206. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
207. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203. Title X funds are federal funds distributed to
medical facilities on the condition that that they do not provide abortion services. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 300a, 300a-6 (1994).
208. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
209. See id. at 192-93.
210. See id.
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woman's right to have an abortion.211  The Court's inconsistent
conclusions in the penalty/nonsubsidy analysis have led scholars to
question the effectiveness of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
as a protection of subsidized speech.212 Additionally, the Court's use
of viewpoint discrimination has been unpredictably selective and
lacking in clarity.2 13 This lack of a sound analytical foundation forces
the Court to analyze subsidized speech by haphazardly applying
disjointed bits of doctrine and theory to important First Amendment
issues.
The shortcomings of the Supreme Court's approach to analyzing
subsidized speech is nowhere more evident than in National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.1 4 Due to the lack of a viable
doctrine with which to analyze the case, Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion avoided a genuine First Amendment analysis and declared
the "decency clause" constitutional while ignoring its intent to block
grants to indecent art. Part III will discuss the disparate and
contradictory Finley opinions.
III. FINLEY: CHOCOLATE-SMEARED FIRST AMENDMENT
After a presentation of the facts underlying Finley v. National
Endowment for the Arts, this part explains the reasoning and
outcome of the California district court's opinion that struck down the
NEA's "decency clause" as an unconstitutional abridgement of free
speech. It then analyzes the three separate United States Supreme
Court opinions that ultimately reversed that holding: Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion; Justice Scalia's concurrence; and Justice
Sorter's dissent.
A. Facts of the Case
The four plaintiffs216 in Finley were performance artists who had
applied for NEA grants before the enactment of 20 U.S.C. §
954(d)(1), the "decency clause. 21 7 Karen Finley, a feminist ideologue,
was notorious for a performance in which she smeared her naked
body in chocolate to symbolize the oppression of women.18 The other
211. See id.
212. See Cole, supra note 15, at 680 (asserting that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is an incomplete and misleading method with which to review subsidized
speech).
213. See Heins, supra note 152, at 101-03 (maintaining that jurisprudential
application of viewpoint discrimination has been confused and ill-defined).
214. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
215. 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
524 U.S. 569 (1998).
216. Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller ("NEA Four"). See
id. at 1457.
217. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 577-79; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
218. See David Lawrence Burnett, First Amendment & 20 U.S.C. § 954-Freedom
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plaintiffs' performances addressed religion, homosexuality,
lesbianism, AIDS, and alcoholism. Although the Performance Artists
Program Peer Review Panel, an advisory panel to the NEA, had
recommended approval of their grants, the National Council on the
Arts recommended disapproval of these controversial projects and the
"NEA Four" were ultimately denied funding.219 The artists brought
suit in 1990, initially alleging that the NEA had violated their First
Amendment rights by rejecting their applications on political
grounds." After the "decency clause 221 was enacted, the National
Association of Artists' Organizations joined as a plaintiff and the
complaint was amended to challenge the decency clause as void for
vagueness and a facial violation of the First Amendment.m
B. The District Court's Opinion: The "Decency Clause" Declared
Unconstitutional
On the district court level, the NEA "decency clause" was
invalidated as inconsistent with the First Amendment.m The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court reversed 2 4
After noting that by creating the NEA in 1965 Congress aspired to
encourage freedom of artistic expression, -s the district court decreed
that decency criteria conflicted with the proper functioning of the
NEA by sweeping "within its ambit speech and artistic expression
which is protected by the First Amendment."226 In determining that
the NEA's subsidized speech was protected, Judge Tashima relied
upon a correlation between academic freedom and artistic expression
and the ways in which both play important roles in cultivating public
of Speech-Requiring the Chairperson of the National Endowment for the Arts to Take
into Account General Standards of Decency When Judging Grant Applications Does
Not Violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment-National Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998), 9 Seton Hall Const. lJ. 173,174 (1998).
219. See Brian R. Collignon, Comment, Taking into Consideration the "Decency
Clause," 38 Washburn LJ. 929, 931 (1999). The NEA denied funding even after
Frohnmayer, Chairperson of the NEA, had returned three of the applications to the
advisory panel for reconsideration and the panel had again recommended approval.
See Finley, 524 U.S. at 577.
220. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 577. Plaintiffs also claimed that the NEA, by releasing
information from their applications to the press, had violated the Privacy Act of 1974.
See id.
221. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
222. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 577-78. First Amendment jurisprudence allows
plaintiffs to challenge statutes without reference to their own conduct through
invocation of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 358-61 (1983); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 59-60
(1976).
223. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1476 (C.D.
Cal. 1992), affd, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
224. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 590.
225. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1473.
226. Id. at 1476.
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discourse.227
In reaching its determination, the court weighed the probable
effects of the NEA's "decency clause" against the intent of the NEA's
enabling legislation.' Relying upon statements made in the
Congressional debates to amend the NEA's enabling statute, the
court indicated that the reason for the change in the grant-making
criteria was clearly to prevent future works similar to "Piss Christ"
from receiving funding.229  Referring to the "decency clause's"
language23°0 the court writes that "[i]n addition to this plain language,
the plethora of comments in the Congressional Record indicates that
the 'decency' provision was intended to act as a bar to funding
controversial projects or artists."'"
In investigating the statutory framework, the court considered
Congress's original intent in establishing the NEA in 1965.32 The
court asserted that Congress had intended to encourage the free
expression of ideas and "to insure that 'conformity for its own sake is
not to be encouraged' and that 'no undue preference should be given
to any particular style or school of thought or expression."'' , 33 The
"decency clause" thus directly conflicted with Congress's original
intent in forming the NEA.
After determining that the speech funded by NEA distributions is
protected by the First Amendment because of its communicative
impact, the court analyzed the denial of funding for controversial
works under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Under an
unconstitutional conditions analysis, a penalty is created when the law
forces an individual to abandon a constitutionally protected right in
order to receive a benefit from the government?33 The court relied
227. See id. at 1474 (citing a statement made by the American Association of
University Professors, the American Council on Education, the Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, and the Wolf Trap Foundation). Part
IV of this Note will develop this argument and place it within a viable framework of
First Amendment analysis.
228. See id. at 1461, 1472-75.
229. See id. at 1461-62.
230. The statute states that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by
which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." 20 U.S.C. §
954(d)(1) (1994).
231. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1470 n.16 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. 28,620-80 (1990)).
232. See id. at 1460.
233. Id. at 1460 (quoting Establishing a National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities, S. Rep. No. 89-300, at 4 (1965)).
234. See id. at 1463. Judge Tashima explained that "it is well-established that 'even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though
the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely."' Id. at 1463 (quoting Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,597 (1972)).
235. See supra notes 199-212 and accompanying text.
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upon the conflicting holdings in Rust v. Sullivan and Perry v.
Sindernann237 in finding that the "decency clause" operated as a
penalty. In Rust, the Supreme Court held that the government could
constitutionally withhold Title X funds from medical clinics that
performed or even discussed abortion with their patients?-, The
Court in Perry, however, held that a public university's conditioning
of employment on refraining from criticizing the school's regents
would constitute an unconstitutional condition.23 9 The district court's
opinion in Finley does not explicitly describe why the "decency
clause" falls into the category of "penalties," thus making it
categorically similar to Perry and not Rust. The court did note:
Defendants correctly argue that denial of a benefit imposes an
unconstitutional condition only when the benefit is conditioned on
the recipient's surrender of (or is imposed as a penalty for)
constitutionally protected activity distinct from that to be funded by
the subsidy.... However, defendants' contention that the present
case does not fall within this proscription is simply wrong.2'
The ambiguity inherent in determining whether a condition will be
determined unconstitutional weakened the decision, as Judge
Tashima was unable to articulate a rationale for finding a penalty.
C. The Supreme Court Reverses
1. The Majority Opinion: Justice O'Connor
In his concurring opinion in Finley, Justice Scalia commented on
Justice O'Connor's decision by remarking that "[t]he operation was a
success, but the patient died."241 Justice O'Connor determined that
the history of the legislative enactment of section 954(d)(1) enabled it
to be treated as an innocuous attempt to modify procedure, not "as a
tool for invidious viewpoint discrimination. '242 The Court thus seems
implicitly to have accepted the constitutionality of section 954(d)(1)
simply because it was heavily debated and laboriously crafted in
Congress. 243
236. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
237. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
238. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203; supra notes 203-11 and accompanying text.
239. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98.
240. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1463 (C.D. Cal.
1992) (citations omitted), aff'd, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), revd, 524 U.S. 569
(1998).
241. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring). This comment indicated that although Justice Scalia agreed that the
statute was constitutional, Justice O'Connor's opinion stripped the statute of its
intended purpose by declaring the decency considerations hortatory.
242. Id. at 582. Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, and Ginsburg.
243. See i& at 581-83; see also Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., NEA v. Finley: A Decision
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While drafting the statute, Congress enlisted the help of an
Independent Commission of constitutional law scholars.2 44  The
Commission had urged Congress away from prohibiting specific types
of speech, as this could clearly be found to constitute impermissible
viewpoint discrimination. 45 In her opinion, O'Connor quoted from
the Congressional debates:
As the sponsors of § 954(d)(1) noted in urging rejection of the
Rohrabacher Amendment: "[i]f we start down that road of
prohibiting categories of expression, categories which are indeed
constitutionally protected speech, where do we end? Where one
Member's aversions end, others with different sensibilities and with
different values begin. 246
The Commission recommended that Congress enact procedural
changes that would increase the role of advisory panels and
underscore the promotion of a diversity of values and beliefs.247
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion deferred to the NEA's
argument that the decency requirement was merely hortatory.248
Generally, an agency may create its own interpretation of statutory
language only when the real intent of the legislature is unclear.249
Here, Justice O'Connor warned that the Court was not trying to
determine whether the NEA had accurately interpreted the meaning
of the "decency clause." 50 She did, however, assert that "the text of §
954(d)(1) imposes no categorical requirement."5 1  Addressing the
statute's vagueness, Justice O'Connor held that the court of appeals
in Search of a Rationale, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 1-2 (1999) (proposing that Finley can be
understood as a decision aimed at "validating a political compromise").
244. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 575.
245. See id.
246. Id. at 582 (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. 28,624 (1990) (statement of Rep.
Coleman)).
247. See id. at 575.
248. See id. at 580-83 (stating that the decency clause imposes no categorical
requirement). The NEA suggested that 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) was hortatory and that
the decency clause was satisfied "merely by ensuring the representation of various
backgrounds and points of view on the advisory panels that analyze grant
applications." Id. at 581. The court of appeals rejected this argument as contrary to
established statutory construction. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts,
100 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). As one commentator
notes, "The problem with the Court's treatment of the statute is not that the Court
read the decency and respect language as merely hortatory in nature, but rather that it
simply avoided committing to any interpretation of the statute whatsoever." Bloom,
supra note 243, at 8.
249. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 958 F.2d 252,256 (9th Cir. 1992).
On the appellate level, the court in Finley dismissed the NEA's Chevron doctrine
argument in which the NEA urged deference to its construction of section 954(d)(1).
See Finley, 100 F.3d at 677 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-45 (1984)).
250. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 581.
251. Id.; see also Bloom, supra note 243, at 7 (noting that the majority's opinion is
extremely vague in determining what the language of section 954(d)(1) means).
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was incorrect to invalidate the statute as vagueY5 Although she
conceded that the language was opaque, she asserted that this was no
reason to invalidate a statute geared toward the distribution of
government subsidiesP s Justice O'Connor dismissed the argument
that a vague statute might over-deter speech2- by declaring that
"when the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign,
the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe." s
Justice O'Connor's assertion ignores well-established First
Amendment concerns such as indoctrination, skewing the
marketplace, and monopolization.256
Justice O'Connor underscored the inherently imprecise and
subjective nature of standards used in selective subsidy statutes.P
Invariably such statutes contain allocative standards such as merit and
excellence. The majority relied on this fact in order to qualify the
"decency clause" as an allocative standard similar to clauses about
artistic merit: "Section 954(d)(1) merely adds some imprecise
considerations to an already subjective selection process."'' The
majority consequently avoided the germane First Amendment issues
through a highly imaginative reading of the "decency clause."
Although this may have paid obeisance to the bipartisan process, it
did nothing to illuminate First Amendment doctrine with respect to
subsidized speech.
252- See Finley, 524 U.S. at 588. Justice O'Connor determined that although the
statute is clear enough for allocational purposes, its wording could raise significant
vagueness issues for a criminal statute or regulatory scheme. See id. A vague or
overly broad statute curbing speech can be struck down to prevent a potential
'chilling effect.'
253. See id. at 588-89. The Court concluded that "[i]n the context of selective
subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity." Id. at 589.
The possibility that the government may skew the marketplace of ideas through
subsidized speech prompted one scholar to query: "the precise question would be
whether the NEA should be allowed powers denied the policeman or, to use my
initial formulation, whether the allocative state should be held to the same First
Amendment standards as the regulatory one." Fiss, Irony, supra note 19, at 33.
254. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 589. Questioning Justice O'Connor's assertion that a
vague statute will not deter speech, one scholar wrote that the "notion of vagueness as
an antidote to viewpoint discrimination would seem to stand the concept of vagueness
on its head." Bloom, supra note 243, at 9. Finley herself has stated that she will no
longer apply for NEA grants, which indicates that the public will have reduced access
to her speech. See C. Carr, Acting Out: Feminist Performances 156 (Lynda Hart &
Peggy Phelan eds., 1993).
255. Finley, 524 U.S. at 589. But see Robert M. O'Neil, Artists, Grants and Rights:
The NEA Controversy Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 85, 104 (1991) (noting
that the decency clause creates a potential chilling effect on artistic expression).
256. These traditional concerns address the issue that the government's message
may be too powerful, drowning out other voices and monopolizing public discourse.
257. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 589.
25& Id at 590.
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2. Concurring Opinion: Justice Scalia
Concurring in the result and joined by Justice Thomas, Justice
Scalia invoked the plain meaning approach to statutory
interpretation. 9 He reasoned that the statute's language was not a
suggestion or an option, but that it mandated that the NEA consider
decency.2 6° Justice Scalia asserted, however, that the decency clause
constituted constitutionally permissible viewpoint discrimination, the
most strictly guarded-against First Amendment infraction.26' To
defend this premise, Justice Scalia explained that the entire process of
judging artistic excellence comprised viewpoint discrimination and
that the NEA represented "institutionalized discrimination. '262 The
inadequacy of the Supreme Court's approach to subsidized speech is
underscored by Justice Scalia's partly correct assertion.
Justice Scalia added that when a government agency distributes
funds, it can dictate whatever terms of viewpoint discrimination it
desires.2 63 This assertion flatly contradicts the substance of the First
Amendment and the principles of freedom of thought.2 4  After
concluding that the statute was constitutional, Justice Scalia alleged
that Justice O'Connor skirted the salient First Amendment issue of
viewpoint discrimination out of deference to the political forces that
created the bipartisan compromise. 265 He noted that "[t]he 'political
context surrounding the adoption of the 'decency and respect' clause,'
which the Court discusses at some length does not change its meaning
or affect its constitutionality. 266
It is certainly true that the First Amendment does not call for a
lessened standard of scrutiny when the statute being analyzed was
created through arduous political compromise. A sound legal analysis
must concur that "it is wholly irrelevant that the statute was a
'bipartisan proposal introduced as a counterweight' to an alternative
proposal that would directly restrict funding on the basis of
viewpoint."267  Unlike Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia read the
259. "I think that § 954(d)(1) must be evaluated as written, rather than as distorted
by the agency it was meant to control." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
260. See id.
261. See id. at 593. Commenting on Mapplethorpe and Serrano, Justice Scalia
argues that "it is perfectly clear that the statute was meant to disfavor-that is, to
discriminate against-such productions." Id. at 594.
262. See id. at 599.
263. See id. at 598-99. Justice Scalia reasons that because the government has no
obligation to fund at all, selective funding is mere surplussage and cannot impose a
penalty. Thus, the government can freely dictate the terms of its largesse. See id.
264. Justice Scalia's argument mirrors the "greater-includes-the-lesser" principle,
which the Supreme Court had previously rejected. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513 (1996); see supra text accompanying note 190.
265. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
266. Id. (citation omitted).
267. Id.
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"decency clause" to be mandatory and determined that viewpoint
discrimination is constitutional, so that when the government is
allocating funds it can do whatever it chooses. Under this view, there
would be no First Amendment protections to subsidized speech
whatsoever. This reasoning has never been accepted by the Court.
3. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Souter
Reaching the opposite conclusion from Justice Scalia, yet utilizing a
similar First Amendment analysis, Justice Souter dissented in
Finley.268 He determined that the statute was viewpoint
discriminatory and was therefore unconstitutional. 9 While Justice
Souter arrived at the soundest conclusion regarding the statute, he
failed to fully explain how to defend his stanceY0 He did, however,
invoke some vital principles of First Amendment jurisprudence, most
notably that "'the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."' '7
Justice Souter asserted that the majority made several crucial
mistakes: "The Court's conclusions that the [decency] proviso is not
viewpoint based, that it is not a regulation, and that the NEA may
permissibly engage in viewpoint-based discrimination, are all patently
mistaken."2 Asserting the societal significance attributed to the arts,
he warned that the "decency clause" was designed to chill speechPm
This warning is strengthened by the Congressional Record that clearly
reveals the legislative purpose to "make sure that exhibits like
[Mapplethorpe and Serrano] are not funded again." 4 In light of the
legislative intent and the "decency clause's" possible effect of
silencing avant-garde art, Justice Souter asserted that it must be
declared unconstitutional 7
The disagreement reflected in the Supreme Court's three opinions
in Finley as to the proper interpretation of the "decency clause" and
its relationship to First Amendment jurisprudence underscores the
need for analytical reform. First Amendment analysis must be
refashioned to protect the NEA from the vicissitudes of public mores
and rabid political conservatism.2 6  The NEA was created to
268. See id. at 600-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
269. See id at 600-01.
270. See id. at 600-23.
271. Id. at 601 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989)).
272- Id
273. See id at 603.
274. Id. (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. 28,642 (1990) (statement of Rep. Alexander)).
275. See id. at 602-03.
276. It has been noted that "[t]he fundamentalist attack on images and the art
world must be recognized not as an improbable and silly outburst of Yahoo-ism, but
as a systematic part of a right-wing political program to restore traditional social
arrangements and reduce diversity." Vance, supra note 4, at 43.
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encourage the arts and to facilitate their innovation and
advancement.' 7 Its enabling legislation asserted the important role
that the arts should play in educating and enlightening all
Americans. 78 The "decency clause" undermines this ambition of
enlightenment and thereby frustrates the purpose of the NEA. Part
IV outlines a more viable doctrine in which to ground analysis of the
First Amendment protections afforded to subsidized speech, and
urges protection for the NEA by analogizing its function in society to
that of schools.
IV. THE PROPHYLACTIC FIRST AMENDMENT: A NOVEL APPROACH
TO THE NEA
In deciding Finley, the Supreme Court appears to have stepped
through the looking glass. Its muddled and polarized opinions
underscore the need to clarify the relationship between the First
Amendment and subsidized speech. Drawing on traditional First
Amendment principles and recent trends in scholarship, this part
proposes an alternative mode of First Amendment analysis for
subsidized speech. This analysis considers the importance of public
debate in a democratic state, the educational institutions upon which
the health of this debate rests, and the goal of the debate to protect
well-informed political deliberation and individual self-expression.27 9
Analogizing the NEA's role in society to that of schools, this part
argues that the Supreme Court must apply the same First Amendment
protections to the NEA that it applies to schools.
A. The First Amendment and Government-Subsidized Speech
As the confusion surrounding the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine makes clear, the Supreme Court has failed to adequately
explain exactly what types of subsidized speech should be protected. 280
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court emasculated the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in order to allow the government to restrict the
speech of Title X clinics, while at the same time conceding that there
are subsidized realms in which such disallowance of speech would be
problematic. 281 The majority opinion in Rust contradicted itself by
277. See supra Part I.A.
278. See supra Part I.A.
279. See Paul G. Stem, Note, A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and its
Relation to Public Discourse, 99 Yale L.J. 925, 926-27 (1990) (noting that the First
Amendment safeguards public debate, which fosters individual freedom and political
liberty).
280. See Cole, supra note 15, at 676-77 (asserting that the Supreme Court's current
stance on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is inadequate for subsidized
speech).
281. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (asserting that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines prevent the government from controlling speech in
universities); see also Cole, supra note 15, at 682 (noting that the Supreme Court fails
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claiming both that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the only
safeguard against governmental tampering with subsidized speech and
by then asserting that there exist unique areas in which otherwise
constitutional government intervention would nevertheless be
unconstitutional.l This inconsistency reveals that the Court is
sensitive to honored democratic traditions such as academic freedom,
but has failed to reconcile the role of the First Amendment in
safeguarding the freedom of vital cultural institutions.,,,
In addition to the unconstitutional conditions analysis, the Supreme
Court has also invoked the doctrine of viewpoint discrimination to
approach First Amendment protections for subsidized speech.21 For
example, the Court's Finley opinions said nothing about the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but instead relied on viewpoint
discrimination, "a principle that is becoming increasingly dominant in
government enterprise cases."''  Concerns about viewpoint are
intertwined with the First Amendment's goal of protecting robust
public debate. Such debate would be markedly impeded if the
government were to "aim[] at the suppression of dangerous ideas."''
Lively public discourse "provides an indispensable means by which all
of us speak to or about one another, however civilly, rudely, or
passionately, before deciding what to do, what values to adopt, and
what ends are worth pursuing."'
Considering the importance of public debate in light of the
theoretical foundation of First Amendment doctrine reveals
normative concerns that argue in favor of protection for the NEA.
First Amendment jurisprudence developed around two distinct ideas:
classical liberalism and the republican approach.3 A viable approach
to the First Amendment protections of subsidized speech must fuse
to explain this inconsistency).
282. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94 (intimating that the only protection to subsidized
speech is the unconstitutional conditions doctrine); see also Cole, supra note 15, at 686
(interpreting Rust to suggest that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the only
First Amendment protection of subsidized speech).
283. See Rust, 500 U.S at 199-200.
284. See Post, Speech, supra note 13, at 152 (declaring that the Supreme Court has
primarily relied upon the doctrines of unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint
discrimination when addressing subsidized speech).
285. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
Harv. L. Rev. 84,104 (1998).
286. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Eberle,
supra note 153, at 1178-79 (stating that two of the goals of a robust dialogue are to
create a capable citizenry and a more perfect polity).
287. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958), quoting American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382,402 (1950)).
288. Eberle, supra note 153, at 1180.
289. See Cole, supra note 15, at 708-09 (explaining that Justice Holmes's liberal
approach to the First Amendment is at odds with Justice Brandeis's republican
conception of the First Amendment).
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these two approaches.29° Classical liberalism was implicit in the views
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, the father of First Amendment theory.29'
In Abrams v. United States ,29 Justice Holmes wrote that "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.., we should be eternally vigilant against
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death."2" Adopting a laissez-faire
approach, classical liberalism perceived the First Amendment as a
vehicle to protect the private speaker and to preserve the individual's
autonomy.294 A failure of this principle, however, is that by ignoring
the potentially deleterious effects of subsidized speech, it fails to
invoke principles for guarding against indoctrination, skewing of the
marketplace, and chilling effect on subsidized speech.295
The republican ideal aims at the facilitation of public debate and
recognizes this process as vital to the project of democratic self-
governance.296 This tradition's foundation lies in Justice Brandeis's
concurrence in Whitney v. California.297 Asserting the importance of
free speech, Justice Brandeis claimed that public discussion is vital to
exposing falsehood and fallacies, and that as a democratic nation "the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. ' 298
Adequate protection of the NEA is dependent upon implementation
of both classical liberalism and republican ideals. Classical liberalism
protects the individuality of the artist's expression, both in terms of its
content and its form. Republican principles protect the functioning of
the NEA itself, guarding it against legislation that would curb the
public discourse and expose the citizenry to the taint of indoctrination.
Together, these doctrines view the First Amendment as aimed at
facilitating and protecting the robust marketplace of ideas, which is
instrumental in cultivating enlightenment of the citizenry.9 In order
for free discussion to flourish, unpopular opinions may not be
290. See id. at 708.
291. See id.
292. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
293. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
294. See Cole, supra note 15, at 708.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 709.
297. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
298. Id. at 377. Recalling the founders of American government, Justice Brandeis
stated:
[T]hey knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies;
and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Id. at 375.
299. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964) (noting a
significant national commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate).
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silenced, either by criminal prohibition or by being drowned out.
Because the government is such a pervasive and vocal speaker, its
message carries with it the danger of drowning out unpopular
speech.' °  In the context of the NEA, this danger presents itself
through the funding of "decent" art, but not "indecent" art.Ml One
way of analyzing the protections that should be afforded to
government-subsidized speech is to divide such speech into the realms
of "public discourse" and "managerial domains."
Recognizing that public discourse is a place for the "forging of an
independent public opinion to which democratic legitimacy demands
that the state [refrain from] censorship," the Supreme Court has
employed the unconstitutional conditions analysis to prevent the
government from silencing subsidized speech such as funded editorials
and broadcasts that fall squarely within the public discourse.-' One
scholar warns that a restriction on freedom in the public discourse
"contradict[s] the central premise of our democratic enterprise. "3
Not all subsidized speech, however, is part of the public discourse, and
sometimes it can be categorized as the state's own speech.Y This
latter type of speech falls within the "managerial domain," where the
government may legitimately impose restrictions to achieve specified
goals." 6 One example of speech in a managerial domain is a
government public health campaign designed to encourage people not
to smoke. In such a scenario, the government need not facilitate both
sides of the debate.
When the government subsidizes speech, the granting of funds for a
particular purpose may "convert a citizen into a public functionary
and thereby alter the nature of the relevant First Amendment rights
and analysis." The significance of this point is that the government
may control its own message in a way that it cannot control the
messages of individuals involved in the public discourse, regardless of
whether these speakers are being subsidized by the government. The
categorization of a function within our culture into the managerial
300. See Hawthorne, supra note 72, at 438; see also Susan M. Gilles, Images of the
First Amendment and the Reality of Powerfid Speakers, 24 Cap. U. L Rev. 293, 303
(1995) (arguing that the government is the dominant speaker in the country).
301. See Bollinger, supra note 15, at 1111 (noting that the government can distort
the marketplace of ideas by overwhelming speech that it dislikes).
302- See Post, Speech, supra note 13, at 164.
303. Id. at 153; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381-82
(1984) (placing editorials within the public discourse because they have traditionally
informed the public and criticized the government).
304. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of
Public Discourse, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109,1132 (1993).
305. See Post, Speech, supra note 13, at 158; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
192-93 (1991) (asserting that the government may constitutionally voice an opinion by
funding speech that "it believes to be in the public interest").
306. See Post, Speed, supra note 13, at 164.
307. Id. at 156.
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domain must be carefully made, for once within, the government has
great latitude to determine the messages that will be tolerated. If the
NEA were so categorized, then its avowed purpose would be for the
government to fashion its own collective concept of our national
culture. Most Americans would rightly fear this sort of indoctrinating
force even more than a crucifix submerged in urine.
The division of subsidized speech into two domains is merely a
starting point. The Supreme Court has not adopted this doctrinal
approach, but it has acknowledged the existence of special arenas
within the public discourse that merit aggressive protection, even
though they are subsidized by the government. In forging a doctrinal
approach, the classification of speech into public discourse and
managerial domains must be followed by the identification of specific
institutions that play vital roles in a democratic state.1 Although
First Amendment doctrine has resisted the identification of
institutions, "it is increasingly clear that the refusal to draw doctrinal
distinctions among culturally distinct institutions is simply unworkable
in the context of the vast and increasing domain of free speech claims
about government land, government funds, and government
employees.""3 9 Institutions such as schools, public broadcasting, the
media, and the NEA indispensably contribute to the vitality of public
debate and should be protected from improper government
regulation.310 These institutions engender thought and preserve the
"constitutional balance between the governed and the governing" by
exposing the citizenry to new ideas and images that force them to
evaluate the status quo.311 They are an indispensable component of
public discourse, and governmental attempts to censor these
institutions threaten the health of a democracy.
B. Schools and the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has asserted that the First Amendment
protections afforded to private speakers are not suspended when
students and teachers enter the grounds of a public school.312 The
next two sections describe the various constitutional protections
afforded within the school framework and argue that the NEA and
308. A variant of this approach focuses on spheres of neutrality by "examin[ing]
the substance and the public purpose of a funded institution or individual in light of
the potential for government funding, with its attendant restrictions, to further or
reduce the recipient's unfettered ability to contribute to public debate in the
marketplace of ideas." Leff, supra note 200, at 389.
309. Schauer, supra note 285, at 86.
310. See id. at 118 (arguing that a cultural rather than legal understanding will
better serve the constitutional goal of affecting the behavior of officials).
311. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 73, 74-78 (1996) (asserting
that art plays an essential role in a representative democracy because it is subversive).
312- See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
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schools serve the public in similar ways. Both institutions expose the
populace to ideas and encourage its members to think and to engage
in discussion. Based on this similarity of function, the First
Amendment should protect the integrity of the NEA's mission of
enlightenment as it does that of schools.
The First Amendment protects the educational mission's endeavor
to cultivate individualism. The Supreme Court has contrasted this
effort with Sparta's deliberate repression of the individual aimed at
forging "ideal citizens. ' '3 3 Pericles's Funeral Oration muses on the
disparity between the societies of Athens and Sparta.3 4 He states that
"There is a difference, too, in our educational systems. The Spartans,
from their earliest boyhood, are submitted to the most laborious
training.. .. ,,31 Such training may have produced valiant citizens, but
Athenian democracy produced thinking citizens. Noting that Athens
submits political issues to public debate, Pericles describes Athens as
"an education to Greece... each single one of our citizens, in all the
manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and
"2316owner of his own person ....
Like Pericles's description of Athenian democracy, the American
educational system encourages a variety of viewpoints on a myriad of
issues to create citizens fully capable of governing themselves. 3 7 In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,318
Justice Fortas set forth the principle that while the freedom to voice
one's opinion may cause a disturbance, "our history says that it is this
sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of
our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society.
' 319
1. Student Speech
In Tinker, a group of public school students donned black armbands
313. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) ("Although such measures have
been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation
between individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest .... ").
314. See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 143-51 (Rex Warner trans.,
Penguin Books 1972) (5th Century B.C.E.).
315. Id. at 146.
316. Id. at 147.
317. Justice Stewart, concurring in the result in Tinker, writes that "[tjhe classroom
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative
selection."' Tinker 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967)).
318. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
319. Id. at 508-09.
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to voice their objections to the conflict in Vietnam.3 20 Three students
were suspended from school for refusing to remove their armbands. 321
Although schools are a government-subsidized speech arena, the
Supreme Court declared the prohibition against wearing black
armbands in protest against the conflict in Vietnam
unconstitutional .322
The Court reasoned that the students' non-verbal protest
constituted speech and was therefore comprehensively protected by
the First Amendment.3" In order for school officials to justifiably
restrict student speech, they would have to show that the expression
would "'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."' 324 Because
the wearing of black armbands did not disrupt the educational agenda
of the school, its officials could not proscribe the expression.3 5 The
school would thus have been able to curb speech in the classroom only
if that speech had interfered with the ability of teachers to conduct
class.326 This standard indicates that schools do not merely serve the
function of academic instruction, but are also fora in which students
are free to express their views and to discuss social and political issues.
2. Removal of Books
In addition to protecting students' right to voice opinions in school,
the First Amendment provides safeguards against the removal of
books from a school's library.327 In Board of Education v. Pico,328 the
Supreme Court extolled the virtues of academic freedom of inquiry
and asserted that a "school library is the principal locus of such
freedom."329 In Pico, the school removed nine books and made one
available subject to parental approval.30 The Court determined that
the removal of books with the intention of suppressing ideas violated
the First Amendment rights of the students.331
The outcome of Pico reveals a concern not for the speaker, but
rather for the audience.332 Pico indicates that students in the school
320. See id. at 504.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 514. The Court's opinion stated "[i]t can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
323. See id. at 505-06.
324. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
325. See id. at 508-09.
326. See id. at 509.
327. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869-72 (1982).
328. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
329. Id. at 868-69.
330. See id. at 856-57.
331. See id. at 871-72.
332. Professor Cole states that "[w]hen the government funds speech, however,
first amendment concerns are not limited to potential coercion of the subsidized
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system have a constitutional right to receive information, not merely
to express their views.333 The unique role of the school system in our
society and the essential function of libraries within that system
demand protection to carry out the objectives of the First
Amendment.3  Thus, beyond the plain meaning of the First
Amendment lie particular objectives that its words must actively
endeavor to meet.335
3. Student Organizations
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a state university
may not deny funding to a school newspaper solely because the
administration disapproved of the views expressed therein.33 In
Joyner v. Whiting,3r7 a traditionally African American newspaper was
denied funding at a school with a primarily black student body after
the paper denounced the increased enrollment of white students at
North Carolina Central University. 33s The Fourth Circuit insisted that
"[a] college, acting 'as the instrumentality of the State, may not
restrict speech... simply because it finds the views expressed by any
group to be abhorrent."'3 39 This statement reveals the Fourth Circuit's
belief that within an educational framework the state may not fund
selected viewpoints while excluding disfavored ones. -4
In 1995, the Supreme Court issued an important decision on the
funding of university publications.Y' Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginiatr2 involved the denial of funds to
a school newspaper because it "primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality. '"3 3 The
speaker, but extend also, and perhaps more importantly, to the listener." Cole, supra
note 15, at 680.
333. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
334. Advocating the fairness doctrine, the Supreme Court has declared that the
function of the First Amendment is to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of
that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee." Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969).
335. "'Once we get away from the bare words of the [First] Amendment, we must
construe it as part of a Constitution which creates a government for the purpose of
performing several very important tasks."' Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (quoting Chafee, Government and Mass
Communications 640-41 (1947)).
336. See Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456,458 (4th Cir. 1973).
337. 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
338. See id. at 458-59.
339. Id. at 460 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 187 (1972)).
340. Citing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Fourth Circuit stated that
"[t]his rule is but a simple extension of the precept that freedom of expression may
not be infringed by denying a privilege." Id.
34L See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
342. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
343. Id. at 823.
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plaintiffs magazine was created to encourage an awareness for and
sensitivity to Christian viewpoints.3 The publication prescribed a
"two-fold mission: 'to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed,
according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to
consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means."' 5
The Appropriations Committee of the Student Council denied Wide
Awake Productions' ("WAP") request that their publisher be
reimbursed $5862. 46
The Student Activities Fund guidelines prohibited the disbursement
of funds to political activities, philanthropic contributions and
activities, religious activities, social entertainment, and activities that
would jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the university. 3 7  A
religious activity was expressly defined as promoting a belief or
expressing one's views about a deity, and thus funding was denied to
WAP's request.38 After appealing unsuccessfully within the structure
of the Student Activities Committee, WAP filed suit, alleging, among
other things, that the university's denial of funding violated its rights
of free speech and the press.349
Although the university had not prohibited WAP from publishing
through the use of its own funds, the Court held that the university's
denial of funding indeed violated WAP's rights to free speech.350 It
noted that "[o]nce it has opened a limited forum... [t]he state may
not exclude speech where its distinction is not 'reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum.""'35 In a publicly-funded university
setting, when the state chooses to fund speech, it must allocate funds
to all speech that is reasonably consistent with the purpose of the
forum. Even when a school allocates the state's resources, it may be
capable of infringing upon free speech rights because "the
government offends the First Amendment when it imposes financial
burdens on certain speakers based on the content of their
expression. '352  In analyzing the forum created through the
university's establishment of the SAF, the Court found that a speech
forum353 had been created.3 4 The SAF constituted a "metaphysical 3 55
344. See id. at 825-26.
345. Id. at 826.
346. See id. at 827.
347. See id. at 825.
348. See id.
349. See id. at 827.
350. See id. at 831-46.
351. Id. at 829 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788,806 (1985)).
352- Id. at 828.
353. The traditional speech fora are streets and parks. See Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) (holding that a "time, place and manner" restriction must
survive careful judicial scrutiny and further a significant government interest);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (invalidating municipal prohibitions
against leafleting on public streets).
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forum-a collection of funds aimed at facilitating speech.
In an attempt to defend its denial of funding to WAP, the university
cited Rust v. Sullivan,356 asserting that the government "must have
substantial discretion in determining how to allocate scarce resources
to accomplish its educational mission."' ' w The Court in Rosenberger
rejected this argument as "unremarkable" and distinguished the case
from Rust.358 The distinction between Rosenberger and Rust hinges on
the status of the subsidized speech involved in either case.359 In Rust,
Title X clinics, funded by the government to encourage childbirth,
were viewed as governmental instrumentalities.w In contrast, the
SAF was viewed as a government-subsidized speech forum.36t The
Court in Rosenberger declared that "the University does not itself
speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead
expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers."' 6 The university would be able to select speech only if the
speech were its own.38
The special character of the university and its crucial role in our
society mandate that the Supreme Court protect robust discussion in
schools. 6 1 The Court's opinion in Rosenberger notes that the denial
of funding to the religious-oriented publication could have the effect
of chilling expressionm Citing the ancient tradition of universities as
centers of learning and pillars of our civilization, the Court stated that
"[v]ital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here."
These principles arise as a result of the function of the university and
its contribution to democracy, indicating that First Amendment
protection is related to both practical and normative considerations.
Other cases have declared that universities cannot discriminatorily
354. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-30.
355. Id. at 830.
356. 500 U.S. 173 (1991); supra note 203 and accompanying text.
357. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832.
35& See id. at 832-33.
359. Subsidized speakers can be "characterized as independent participants in the
formation of public opinion or instead as instrumentalities of the government." Post,
Speech, supra note 13, at 152.
360. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-93. "The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way." Id. at 193.
361. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S at 829.
362. Id. at 834.
363. See id
364. The selection of certain institutions as autonomous and protected by the First
Amendment because of their traditional role in our society has been criticized. See
Bollinger, supra note 15, at 1116-17 (arguing that the expression that emerges from
these institutions should be judged independently).
365. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
366. Id.
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deny funding to gay and lesbian student organizations.367 In one such
case, Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn,363 a student
organization ("GLSA") that provided education and support
regarding homosexuality was denied funds by the Student Senate.369
The Eighth Circuit held that the school had impermissibly
discriminated based on its dislike for the views of the GLSA.37 ° The
opinion states that "a public body that chooses to fund speech or
expression must do so even-handedly, without discriminating among
recipients on the basis of their ideology. 3 71 The Eighth Circuit adds
that "[t]his will mean, to use Holmes' phrase, that the taxpayers will
occasionally be obligated to support not only the thought of which
they approve, but also the thought that they hate. That is one of the
fundamental premises of American law. 372
4. Faculty Speech
A seminal United States Supreme Court case determined that the
faculty members in the state university system of New York could not
be forced to sign certificates assuring the university that they were not
Communists.373  Aimed at eliminating any potentially subversive
personnel from the state university system, the certificate declared
that the faculty member "was not a Communist, and that if he had
ever been a Communist, he had communicated that fact to the
President of the State University of New York. ' 374 In Keyishian v.
Board of Regents,375 the Supreme Court determined that the First
Amendment prohibits the state from forcing university faculty
members to sign such certificates as a condition to employment.376
In the context of the university, the nature of the forum dictates
that the state cannot permissibly control the thoughts of its university
employees. To do so would frustrate the purpose of higher education
and "'impose [a] strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities [and] [] imperil the future of our Nation.' 377
Discussing the special First Amendment protections afforded in the
367. See, e.g., Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n. v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir.
1988) (concluding that the state cannot constitutionally deny a benefit if it infringes
upon one's interest in freedom of speech); Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor,
110 F.3d 1543, 1550 (11th Cir. 1997) (invalidating an Alabama statute that allowed a
state university to refuse to fund a gay, lesbian, and bisexual student organization).
368. 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988).
369. See id. at 362.
370. See id. at 367-68.
371. Id. at 362.
372. Id.
373. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
374. Id. at 592.
375. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
376. See id. at 604.
377. Id. at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,250 (1957)).
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school context, the Supreme Court wrote that "[academic] freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 'The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools."' 8
C. The NEA is Like a School
The First Amendment approaches adopted by the Supreme Court
in the context of subsidized speech have been both confused and
unsatisfying. Through haphazard reliance on the unconstitutional
conditions analysis and concerns about viewpoint discrimination, the
Court has created a morass of unpredictability and has failed to
implement a protective First Amendment device that can be
uniformly applied to subsidized speech. As the Court pointed out in
Rust, there are areas of funded expression that merit protection
beyond that provided by the unconstitutional conditions analysis. 9
The Court, however, has been either unwilling or incapable of
delineating what these areas are and how the First Amendment can be
cogently and consistently applied to them.
One of these arenas of special concern to the First Amendment is
schools. The reason for such great concern and strengthened First
Amendment protection is that schools disseminate knowledge and act
as breeding grounds for thought and the cultivation of an educated
citizen who is capable of self-governance s1 Courts, policy makers,
and theorists repeatedly assert the vital nature of a challenging and
uninhibited educational mission. In Keyishian, the Court stated that
"[t]he Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas."3' 3 This truism has
compelled the Court to stringently protect freedom of speech within
378. Id (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960)).
379. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,199-200 (1991).
380. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedon A "Special Concern of the First
Amendmen4" 99 Yale LJ. 251, 255 (1989) (asserting that constitutional academic
freedom was created to shield education from political interference).
381. Commenting on knowledge's primal role, Isaiah Berlin wrote:
The advance of knowledge stops men from wasting their resources upon
delusive projects. It has stopped us from burning witches or flogging lunatics
or predicting the future by listening to oracles or looking at the entrails of
animals or the flight of birds. It may yet render many institutions and
decisions of the present-legal, political, moral, social-obsolete, by showing
them to be as cruel and stupid and incompatible with the pursuit of justice or
reason or happiness or truth ....
Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind 116 (1949).
382. See William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in
the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Summer 1990, at 79, 114 (declaring that Justice Brennan positioned
academic freedom in the First Amendment's nucleus rather than in its periphery).
383. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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the subsidized context of schools. As such, the government may not
restrict non-disruptive student speech, remove library books, disfavor
published speech, deny funding for disfavored student organizations,
or censor faculty speech.
Art serves a similarly important function by challenging people to
question accepted tenets through viewing issues in a novel light."'
The Court, however, has failed to recognize that the similarity of
schools and the NEA implicates equal First Amendment treatment.
Because both schools and the NEA are funded by the state, courts
must forge similar First Amendment treatments that cannot be
loosened by the presence of government monies.3 15 Because the
government funds speech in other areas that engender thought and
enlighten our society, an analytical map must be provided with which
to identify these unique institutions. Based on its founding precepts,
the NEA is also an institution of thought and expression. 86 Although
the government funds the NEA, the principles behind its creation and
its societal function mirror that of schools and dictates that the
Supreme Court apply the First Amendment in a similar prophylactic
fashion.3 7
The fact that the NEA is far smaller in scale and impact does not
detract from the mission behind its creation. The sentiments and
objectives in the minds of the politicians who founded the NEA to
encourage artistic diversity indicate the importance of its cultural
mandate.38s These ideals are echoed on the NEA's website, which
states that the NEA "serves the public good by nurturing the
expression of human creativity. '389  Viewpoint discrimination
undermines the NEA's original precepts because "the politicalization
of art is a restrictive, discriminatory, and dangerous concept that
inhibits the free exchange of ideas and, therefore, limits the visions
and viewpoints society can access.''390
384. See Anne L. Rody, Federal Arts Funding at What Cost? The Impact of
Funding Guidelines on the First Amendment and the Future of Art in America, 1
Fordham Ent. Media & Intell. Prop. L.F. 175, 197 (1991) (discussing the fact that
cubism, futurism, dadaism, expressionism, surrealism, and modernism have
encouraged the deconstruction of accepted societal values).
385. See Leff, supra note 200, at 412 (noting that both subsidized artistic expression
and academic speech occupy a special realm in constitutional jurisprudence).
386. See supra Part I.A.
387. See Bollinger, supra note 15, at 1116 (arguing that democracy dictates that the
First Amendment should protect all endeavors aimed at understanding the human
and natural world).
388. See Julie A. Shaya, Note, Can the Government Regulate Expression in the
Public Forum?, 70 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 893, 894 (1993) (noting that although some
expression offends, speech restrictions frustrate the NEA's original intent); supra Part
I.A.
389. The NEA Website (visited Oct. 5,1999) <http://www.arts.endow.gov/learn>.
390. Brenda L. Tofte, "Baby, It's Cold Outside:" The Chilling Effect of the Decency
Clause on the Arts in the Aftermath of National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 22
Hamline L. Rev. 303, 304 (1998); see also Farthing, supra note 151, at 1980-81 (stating
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The 1965 Senate Report accompanying the legislation that
established the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities
reflects a clear symbiosis of the endowments for the humanities and
for the arts. In conjunction with one another, they "are of central
importance to our society and to ourselves as individuals. They at
once express and shape our thoughts. ''391 Exposure to Mapplethorpe's
photographs encourages people to question their values and "acts as a
catalyst for change as people begin speaking to one another."392 This
crucial role of the arts in the public discourse underscores the need to
shield support for the arts from political interference that invariably
seeks to remove unpopular ideas from the marketplace for fear that
they will lead to societal upheaval. 3 3
People expect that the government will fund schools. The history of
the NEA and the prominence it has gained and created in the world of
the arts has also led artists to rely upon the government for financial
assistance. By supporting the arts, the government's approbation "has
become nearly a sine qua non of an arts institution's survival. Federal
grants provide essential 'seed money' to fledging organizations, and
serve as an imprimatur of the seriousness and responsibility that is
crucial for attracting private support. "391 The combination of a
financial contribution expected by the people and the expressive
nature of the activities of art and education make it only natural that
the First Amendment must afford these arenas great protection. If
the NEA remains unprotected, political forces may contort its role
and fashion it into a mouthpiece for conservative ideologues, thereby
allowing the government to float a cloud of indoctrination over our
national discourse. This would violate the First Amendment's most
strongly held tenets of free speech, open discourse, and a multitude of
voices in the ideological marketplace.
Under traditional legal thinking, were the NEA to receive the
heightened degree of protection that it should be afforded in light of
its cultural mission, the "decency clause" would be rejected as an
unconstitutional exercise of viewpoint discrimination, or as an invalid
penalty on artists receiving funding. This conclusion is analytically
sound in view of the importance of art to original thinking in a
that viewpoint discrimination undermines the First Amendment's central purpose of
encouraging expression, thought, dreams, aspiration, and self-government).
391. Establishing a National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, S. Rep. No.
89-300, at 7 (1965).
392. Tofte, supra note 390, at 352 ("Art motivates people to speak out against
tyrannies and injustice, creates significant challenges to the status quo and encourages
people to exercise their voices and make their viewpoints heard.").
393. See Leff, supra note 200, at 412 (noting that when Congress created the NEA,
it wanted to avoid the imposition of a favored style and to protect the NEA from
political tampering).
394. Hawthorne, supra note 72, at 444. See Leff, supra note 200, at 405 (stating that
the receipt of an NEA grant allows an organization to attract collateral funding).
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democracy.395 By creating the NEA, Congress established a forum to
promote a diversity of speech; it did not create a vehicle to fund its
own speech.396 In addition, under the proposed reconceptualization of
subsidized speech the NEA should be classified within the public-
discourse realm of subsidized speech, and in view of the goals of
classical liberalism and republican values in shaping First Amendment
jurisprudence,3" should receive the heightened protection provided to
school speech.
CONCLUSION
The traditional methods of First Amendment analysis fail to
effectively protect the NEA. The opinions in the Finley case
underscore the unresolved nature of First Amendment jurisprudence
in the context of subsidized speech. Both viewpoint discrimination
analysis and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine do not account
for the role of funded institutions in the process of self-government.
This failure threatens to undermine the First Amendment's core
principle of preserving the integrity of the marketplace of ideas. In
order to avoid this threat, the Supreme Court must adopt a more
coherent and protective approach to analyzing subsidized speech.
This approach begins by classifying subsidized speech into realms of
public discourse and managerial domains. Speech falling into the
public discourse and belonging to a unique cultural institution should
be afforded heightened First Amendment protection. Schools are an
example of this type of speech, and speech within the school context is
already afforded aggressive protection. Because the NEA's purpose,
mission, and effect on our culture are similar to that of schools, it
should be afforded the same degree of protection.
395. See Hamilton, supra note 311, at 87-88 (asserting that art causes the viewer to
experience reorientation by challenging her preconceived world view).
396. See supra notes 350-52 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 289-306 and accompanying text.
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